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TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE
CORPORATIONS
Dox\AiD

CAMPBELL'

CHARITABLE corporation is one organized for
the administration of a charitable trust, and not
for the profit of its members. It would seem, therefore,
that a charitable corporation is simply a charity operating through corporate organization, and is necessarily
a trust. Hospitals, educational institutions, and other
charities in the popular sense are included thereunder.
The test is whether it exists to carry out a purpose recognized in law as charitable and is not maintained for gain,
profit, or private advantage. 2
The rule is well settled in Illinois that a charitable
corporation is not liable for the negligent or tortious
acts of its officers or agents.3 This statement of the law
does not obtain in all other jurisdictions, and the various
states are not entirely in harmony regarding the law.
To lay down a uniform rule is difficult. If the general,
established rule is to be stated, such statement should
include the limitation that the corporation is not liable
for injuries resulting from tortious acts of its agents
where the corporation has exercised due care in its selection of such agents.
It is necessary to turn to the adjudicated cases to
discover the reasons for the inharmonious holdings of
the various states. In those jurisdictions where the
corporation is held to be not liable, the reason for the
rule seems to be based upon one or more of the three
following propositions: First, liability would result in a
diversion of trust funds. Second, liability is contrary to
public policy. Third, estoppel: assumed risk of the
claimant who has accepted the charity.
If the cases which fall under the first proposition are
examined it is found that the courts adopted the rule
that a charitable corporation, although privately organA

'Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
"Morgan v. National Trust Bank of Charleston, 331 Ill. 182.
'Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381.
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ized and managed, is deemed an arm of the sovereign, at
least to the extent that it is operating for the benefit of
the public. If this rule is taken as a premise, then it
should be possible for all states to adopt the same rule,
since it seems to be uniformly held that the act of any
involuntary corporation or charitable institution organized by a sovereign, directly or indirectly, is an act of
that sovereign. The non-liability of the sovereign for
the acts of its agents in exercising such governmental
functions is unquestioned.
In a recent case before the Illinois Supreme Court,'
the Court therein reviewed several cases 5 which indirectly support the proposition that charitable corporations are agencies of the state, exercise a portion of the
sovereign power of the state, and may lawfully receive
appropriations to carry out municipal activities.
There should be no doubt then that non-liability should
follow, predicated upon the familiar rule that the sovereign-municipal or otherwise-is not liable for torts of
its agents while performing duties imposed by law. Education, hospitalization, and care of the poor fall within
such duties. The Illinois Supreme Court has said that
charitable corporations "lessen the burden of government. '" 6 Such a conclusion brings the reason stated
under the first proposition to be in fact included in that
stated under the second where non-liability is based on
the ground of public policy, which in itself is a sufficient
reason without further search.
Many practical reasons exist for holding the proposition first stated to be sufficient. Our Illinois Supreme
Court said, about twenty-five years ago:
The funds and property thus acquired [by such a corporation] are held in trust, and cannot be diverted to
the purpose of paying damages for injuries caused by
the negligent or wrongful acts of its servants or employees to persons who are enjoying the benefit of the
charity. An institution of this character, doing chariFurlong v. South Park Commissioners, 340 Il1. 363.
Bullock v. Billheimer, 175 Ind. 428; Sambor v. Hadley, 291 Pa. 395;
Hagar v. Kentucky Children's Home Soc., 119 Ky. 235; Boehm v. Hertz,
182 Ill.154.
1 Morgan v. National Trust Bank of Charleston, 331 Ill. 182.
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table work of great benefit to the public without profit
and depending upon gifts, donations, legacies and bequests made by charitable persons for the successful
accomplishment of its beneficial purposes, is not to be
hampered in the acquisition of property and funds from
those wishing to contribute and assist in the charitable
work, by any doubt that might arise in the minds of such
intending donors as to whether the funds supplied by
them will be applied to the purposes for which they intended to devote them, or diverted to the entirely different purpose of satisfying judgments recovered against
the donee because of the negligent acts of those employed
to carry the beneficent purpose into execution.'
If a private charitable corporation is actually engaged
in dispensing a charity without profit, to such of the public as care to apply therefor, it ought not to have its
efficiency destroyed, or its funds diverted by reason of
tortious acts of its agents, who must of necessity be
acting beyond the scope of their authority.
Yet, this practical reason is not wholly sound. It
might well be said that all corporations for profit receive
their capital contributions for specific purposes and that
the corporations do not contemplate, nor do their stockholders desire, that such capital funds shall be subjected
to inroads by reason of tortious acts of the corporation's
agents. Nevertheless, the capital funds are often diverted
from corporate charter purposes to pay for damages
assessed against the body corporate for torts of their
agents, even though such agents be acting-and thereby
causing the corporation to act-outside of the spirit and
purpose of the corporation's charter powers. 8 It
should be noted that in the case of Parks v. Northwestern University, above quoted, the claimant was receiving benefits from a corporation at the time of the
tort complained of, and was, therefore, subject to the
estoppel mentioned in the third proposition.
If we consider the second proposition we may again
assert that public policy is both a means and an end,
and is in itself a sufficient reason for the multitude of
cases it has been called upon to cover.
'Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381 (at 385).
'Hannon v. Siegal-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y. 244; South & North Alabama
R. R. Co. v. Chappell, 61 Ala. 527: Bissell v. Michigan Southern and
Northern Indiana R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258.
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The liability of a municipal corporation seems greater
than that of a charitable corporation, for as soon as a
municipal corporation steps outside of its governmental
functions, and acts ministerially, and not in the discharge of a duty imposed by law solely for the benefit
of the public, it is bound to see that its agents do their
On
work in a reasonably safe and skillfull manner.
the other hand, a purely charitable organization is, by
the weight of authority at least, held not liable for the
torts or neglect of its servants where it has used-due
care in their selection."0
The third proposition is in reality a rule of estoppel
rather than a basis for the general rule, for it can necessarily be applied only to such persons as have requested
or contracted for the benefits of a charity. It does not
include all those persons who might, while in the exercise of ordinary car for their own safety, be the object
of tortious acts without request or contract with the
corporation. It might well be that the estoppel as stated
in the third proposition would not operate in those jurisdictions where the general rule of non-liability does not
obtain, thus admitting a remedy to those persons who
are injured by the corporation's agents.
For the practical administration of justice there really
is no need to distinguish between the first and second
propositions. A Connecticut court states this view:
It is, perhaps, immaterial whether we say the public
policy which supports the doctrine of respondeat superior does not justify such extension of the rule, or say
that the public policy which encourages enterprises for
charitable purposes requires an exemption from the operation of a rule based on legal fiction, and which, as
applied to the owners of such enterprises, is clearly opposed to substantial justice. It is enough that a charitable corporation like the defendant, whatever may be
the principle that controls its liability for corporate
neglect in the performance of a corporate duty, is not
liable, on grounds of public policy, for injuries caused
by personal wrongful neglect in the performance of his
duty by a servant whom it has selected with due care."
Chicago, 258 ill. 494 at 498.
'Johnston v. City of 3rd
Ed., 1011.
102 Cooley on Torts,
"Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Coion. 98.
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As to the contrary view, an early case in Rhode Island
held that a charitable institution was answerable for
the negligent acts of its employees,' 2 but the Legislature
of Rhode Island thereafter exempted all hospitals whose
funds were exclusively devoted to charitable purposes.
Just how far the contrary view may go, even where the
claimant apparently has assumed the risk, appears from
a decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama.
It is a well-known fact, of which courts may take
judicial notice, that many of the most noted institutions
of this country for the treatment of the sick were established by endowments, are not operated for profit, accept
charity patients, and are such as come within the definition of charitable institutions laid down in the books.
We are unable to see upon what line of reasoning one
who is willing to pay, and does pay, full price for services to be rendered, should be held to have exempted the
institution from all liability merely because it is not operated for profit.
With that the patient is not concerned, nor indeed, is
he in any mood or condition to inquire. He is seeking
restoration to health. He expects to pay the full price,
and can it be said with any show of reason that, because
forsooth the money which he pays is not to be paid out
as dividends or profits, he lays himself liable to injury
by the negligence of those in whose charge he places himself, or even it may be-and the doctrine followed to
its ultimate conclusion would logically so lead-to the
willful or wanton wrongful conduct of the servants
in
13
charge of the institution. We think not, clearly.
It is indeed fortunate for the public at large that the
Alabama court is in the minority column and that the
established rule is directly to the contrary. Their past
history, however, does not disclose that charitable corporations are prone, either by negligence or willful and
wanton conduct, to perpetrate torts upon their patrons
or upon third persons. Some assurance or proper administration of these corporations may also be found
in the familiar rule that the agent or officer is in all cases
individually and personally liable for his tortious acts.
"Glavin

v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 Rhode Island 411.
11Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572.

